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therefor: Bonsteel v. Vanderbilt, 21 Barb. 26; Briggs v. Same,
19 Id. 22; Williams v. Same, 29 Id. 491. See Williams v. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y. 217; West v. Steamer Uncle Sam, 1 McAll. C.
C. 505.
In some cases the liability of shipowners has been limited by
statute to the value of the. ship and freight at the time of the loss
or injury: 7 Geo. 2, c. 15; 26 Geo. 3, c. 86; 53 Geo. 3, c. 159;
17 & 18 Viet. c. 104, § 503; 25 & 26 Vict. c. 63, § 54; 9 U. S.
Stats. at Large 635; Mass. Gen. Stats. c. 52, §§ 18-21; Maine
Rev. Stats. (1857), c. 35, §§ 5 & 6.
In a late ease (Duckett v. Latterfield,Law Rep. 3 C.P. 227;
see 13 C. B. N. S. 616) in England, it appears that by charterparty the charterer agreed to load a full and complete cargo of
sugar in cases, or other lawful merchandise, at a certain rate per
ton for sugar, and for other produce a rate proportionate to sugar
in casks with sufficient bags, agreeably to the custom of the port
for loading. The charterer loaded a full cargo of cotton, with
sixty-one tons of stone for ballast, which would have been unnecessary if sugar had been loaded: Held, that a full cargo had
been loaded, and that the -charterers were not bound to furnish
any bags for broken stowage with this cargo: Ibid. And under
a charter-party, providing that a ship should proceed to a certain
port "with all convenient speed, on being ready," delay for a few
days from a deviation, unaccompanied by any serious loss to the
freighters, does not justify them in abandoning the contract:
JeAndrew v. -happle, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 643.
H. N. S.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Judicial Court of l7aine.
AMELIA A. KNIGHT v. THE'PORTLAND, SACO, AND PORTSMOUTH RAILROAD COMPANY.
A through ticket over three several distinct -lines of passenger transportation,
issued in the form of three tickets on one piece of paper, and recognised by the
proprietors of each line, is to be regarded as a distinct ticket for each line.
The rights of a passenger purchasing such a ticket, and the liabilities of the proprietors of the several lines recognising its validity, are the same as if the purchase
had been made at the ticket office of the respective lines.
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Common carriers of passengers are not bound to insure the absolute safety of
their passengers; but they are required to exercise the strictest care consistent with
the reasonable performance of their contract of transportation.
To render them liable for an injury to a passenger while under their charge, it
is enough if it was caused solely by any negligence on their part, however slight,
if, by the exercise of the strictest care and precaution, reasonably within their
power, the injury would not have been sustained.
Where the plaintiff's ticket entitled her to a passage over the defendants' road
to Portland, and by steamboat from Portland to Belfast; and the defendants had
built their track ulpon their wharf down to the steamboat, and had run their passenger train upon it for a time, and still continued to run their baggage train
there ; and they directed .their passengers verbally, or by printed sign, to use the
wharf as a passage-way to the boat, and they did so use it; and they made the
whurf subsidiary and necessary to the proper use and enjoyment of their road; in
an action by the plaintiff to recover for an injury upon the wharf :-Held,
1. That the defendants are bound to exercise the same degree of care, in making
the wharf safe and convenient for their through passengers to travel over, as is
required of common carriers of passengers, although they required them to disembark at their depot, forty rods distant from the steamboat; and,
2. That this liability continued until, in the ordinary course of their passage
over the wharf, they reached the point where the liability of the steamboat company commenced.

ON exceptions, and motion to set aside the verdict as being
against the weight of evidence and excessive in amount of
damages.
Case, for injury received at the slip on the defendants' wharf
in Portland.
The defendants requested the presiding judge to instruct the
jury:1. That the defendants were under no obligations to carry the
plaintiff beyond the point at which they regularly received and
discharged passengers in Portland:
2. That, when they had safely carried the plaintiff from their
station in Berwick to their station in Portland, and had safely
delivered her from their depot in the latter place, their duty as
carriers of passengers ceased:
3. That the wharf in Portland, uted by the steamboat company
for the purposes of its business, though owned by the defendants,
was not such a part of the appliance of the defendants' railroad
as the defendants, in their capacity of carriers of passengers, are
responsible for the condition of:
4. That, if the jury should find that a slip or drop was necessarv for the transaction of the business of the wharf, and it was
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constructed in the best known manner and with all usual and rea
sonable precautions for safety, and had no unreasonable or improvident space for its movement, but only. sufficient for its easy and
convenient operation, then the defendants have been guilty of no
laches and cannot be held in this action.
The presiding judge declined to give the irst three requested
instructions, but gave the fourth, with this addition :-" but, if
the space between the wharf and slip, though necessary to be kept
open for the movement of the slip in raising it or letting it down,
did not need to be kept open while in actual use for passengers
to pass over, and the care required for common carriers of passengers rendered it necessary that it should be closed or guarded
on such occasions, and the accident was caused wholly by the
neglect of the defendants to close it or to provide all reasonable
safeguards against passengers stepping into it, the defendaiqs
would be liable."
But the jury, together with other things not objected to, were
instructed as follows:Common carriers of passengers are required to exercise the
strictest care which is consistent with the reasonable performance
of their contract of transportation.
While they are not bound to insure the absolute safety of their
passengers, they are required to make use of such safeguards for
the protection of their passengers as science auid art have devised,
and as experience has proved to be efficacious in accomplishing
their object.
It is not sufficient that they exercise slight, common, or even
great care.

They have discharged their duty only when they have employed all the means reasonably in their power to prevent
accident.
. To render them liable for an injury to passengers, while under
their charge, it' is not necessary that they be. guilty of gross or
great negligence; it is enough if the accident was caused solely
by any negligence on their part, however slight, if, by the exercise
of the strictest care or precaution, reasonably within their power,
the injury would not have been sustained.
That the arrangements between the several connecting companies, by which each sold tickets through, only imposed on each
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the obligation to carry passengers over its own portion of the
entire route.
If the plaintiff purchased a through ticket to Belfast at Lawrence, and the defendants recognised the validity of that ticket
by passing her over their road, they took upon themselves the
duties and responsibilities of common carriers of passengers as
effectually as if the ticket had been purchased at their office in
Berwick.
The plaintiff'd ticket entitled her to a passage over the defendants' road to Portland, and, by steamboat, from Portland to Belfast; and, if the defendants built their track down to the steamboit upon the wharf, running their passenger train down upon it
for a time, and their baggage train there at the time of the accident; and, if they directed their passengers verbally or by a
printed sign to use the wharf as a passage-way to the boat, and
they did so use it, and, if they made the wharf subsidiary and.
necessary to the proper use and enjoyment of their road, they are,
bound to exercise the same degree of care in making the wharf'
safe and convenient for passengers to travel over, which is required'
of common carriers of passengers, though at the time of the accident they detained their passenger train at their depot, and required their passengers to disembark at that place.
The jury, under these instructions and others not excepted to,.
returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and assessed damages at$2500, and the defendants alleged exceptions.
The principal facts testified to by the plaintiff appear in the,
opinion.

Nathan Webb, for the defendants, cited Schopman v. Boston,
and Wor. Railroad Co., 9 Cush. 24; Spraguwe v. Smith, 29 Vt.
421; Rood v. N. Y. & N. Haven Railroad Co., 22 Conn. 1;:
Naugatuck Railroad Co. v. Waterbury Button Co., 24, Id. 468;
Farmers' and Jlfech. Bank v. Champlaiu . Co.,. 18 Vt. 140;&raiton v. . Y. & New Haven Railroad Co., 2 E. D. Smith:
184; Norway A. Co. v. B. & M. Railroad Co.,. 1 Gray 263;
Nutting v. Conn. Riv. Railroad Co., Id. 502; 2 Redf. on Railways; 3d ed., 227, 228; Ackley v. Kellogg, 8 Cow.. 223;. Van
Santroon,v. St. John, 6 Hill 158.
J"ewett, for the plaintiff.
VoL. XVI.-42
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APPLETON,

C. J.-This was an action on the case against the

defendants for negligence.
It appeared in evidence from the plaintiff, that she, on the 10th
August, 1866, purchased at Lawrence, Mass., a through ticket
from that place to Belfast, in this state, for which she paid $4;
that the ticket so purchased was on one piece of paper, but creased
for three different tickets; that one part of the ticket was taken
by the conductor on the Boston & Maine Railroad, soon after she
entered the cars at Lawrence; that a second part was taken at
South Berwick by the conductor of the defendant corporation,
and the third part on board the steamer, between Portland and
Belfast; that she arrived about 11 o'clock at night at the defendants' depot at Portland, where the cars stopped; that she left the
cars there to walk to the steamboat Regulator, which lay at the
end of a wharf contiguous; that the way to the steamboat was
dark; that she proceeded in company with other passengers from
.the depot to the place of embarkation, without accident, until
-within, as she judged, from ten to fifteen feet of the edge of the
,wharf, when, as she was walking along a level surface, without
-warning of any danger, she stepped her foot into a hole or open5ing in the planking of the wharf, over which she was passing,
:and fell backward and fainted; that it was found, on examination,
-that the small bone of her right leg had been fractured and her
.right ankle sprained and lamed, and that her back and side were
wrenched and lamed; that it was a considerable distance from
where the passengers left the cars to the place where they go on
board the boat; that she heard, no directions nor instructions by
any officer of the railroad or steamboat about getting from the
cars to the boat, nor saw any one to guide her, and that no one
accompanied her with a light; and that she had been over this route
"twice before.
It -was admitted that an arrangement for the sale of through
tickets.and division of the price, existed be.tween the steamboat
.and railroad companies over which the plaintiff passed, and
-that the baggage of passengers was.checked through; and that
-the wharf from which the steamboat sailed and on which the
iplaintiff was when injured, was the property of the defendant
corporation.
.
It was in evidence that the distance from thle place where the,
cars stopped in the depot, at Portland, to the steamboat, was
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about forty rods, and that the defendants had a side track running
from their main track, near the depot, to within six or eight feet
of the steamboat; that, until within four or five years, passenger
cars had been run down this side track to the steamboat; but
that, since that time, the use of the side track for passenger cars
had been discontinued; and that it was still and had constantly
been used for running freight and baggage cars to the steamboat.
The defendants introduced evidence tending to show that, at
the entrance to the steamboat wharf was a guide-board, or sign,
indicating the way to the steamboat.
There was evidence introduced tending to show that the wharf
was in good condition, and that it was amply lighted, and evidence
to the contrary.
1. The through tickets in the form of coupons, purchased at
Lawrence, entitled the plaintiff to pass over the defendants' road.
They are to be regarded as distinct tickets for each road, sold by
the first company as agents for the other companies. The rights
and liabilities of the parties are the same as if the purchase had
been made of the defendants at their station: Sehopman v. Boston J Worcester Railroad Co., 9 Cush. 24; iS'rague v. Smith,
29 Vermont 421; .Bood v. N. Y.
N. H. Railroad (o., 22
Conn. 1; 2 Redfield on Railroads, § 185. But railroads may
so issue their tickets and so conduct themselves as to have the
purchasers understand that they undertake for the whole route,
in which case they will be held responsible to that extent:
Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y., A. 806; Blake v. G. W. Bailroad Co., 7 Hurlst. & N. 987.
2. The degree of care and caution required of the carriers
of passengers was correctly stated. by the presiding justice and
in accordance with the authorities. The care to be used depends
somewhat upon the value and importance of what is to be carried.
The greater the value to be transported, the greater the need of
care and caution on the part of the carrier. If the business is
of the highest moment, then the skill, care, and diligence should
be in proportion thereto. In Fordv. London . S. WF Railway
Co., 2 F. & F. 732, Mr. Chief Justice ERLE uses the following
language :-" The action is grounded on negligence. The railway company is bound to take reasonable care, to use the best
precautions in known practical use for securing the safety and
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convenience of passengers." In -PhiladelphiaJ-Beading Bailroad Co. v. -Derby, 14 Howard 486, Mr. Justice -GRIEF remarks
as follows :-" When cairiers undertake to convey passengers by
the.powerful and dangerous agency of steam, public policy and
safety require that they be held to the greatest possible care and
diligence." The question came before this court in -Edwardsv.
Lord, 49 Maine 279, and the instructions given in this case will
be found in accordance with the views of the court as there
expressed.
3. The depot and the grounds around the depot belonging to
the defendant corporation, and used in connection therewith,
should be in safe condition for those who, in the course of travel,
are obliged to pass over them. The defendants own the wharf.
It is in their use for the purpose of their business as carriers.
The cars containing the baggage for the steamboat, with which
the defendant corporation is connected, pass over it. The cars,
with passengers for the steamboat, formerly passed over it, though
they are now discontinued. The wharf is used by the railroad
and in -connection with the boat. The passengers for the boat
pass over it on their way to the boat. It is the way provided.
It is the way passengers in the cars are directed to take. The
train arrives in the evening. Passengers from the cars to the
boat pass rapidly over the intervening distance. The wharf
should be lighted. The servants of the defendant corporation
should be-in readiness to point out the way. The wharf should
be safe. The defendants should be justly held responsible for
any neglect of their servants, or for any deficiencies in the wharf.
which,.with due care, might be avoided. If the defendants bad
carried the plaintiff over the wharf, as heretofore, in their cars,
and she had been injured in consequence of the neglect of the
defendants, she would have been entitled to recover. Her rights
are none the less because she walks over the wharf-to reach the
steamboat, than if she had been borne over.it, if, on the way,
she is injured through the negligence of the defendants by leaving the wharf in an unsafe and dangerous condition. The defendants are not released from liability because, for their convenience.
she used her own limbs, when she might be entitled to the use of
their cars. Their liability did not cease the moment the cars
reached the depot. It continued, equally as if At the depot, while
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she was on her way over the defendants' wharf, and, by their
direction, to the steamboat, and until, in the ordinary course of
her passage, she should reach the point where the liability of the
steamboat company commences. The passage contracted for was
from Lawrence to Belfast. The plaintiff was in itinere from the
point of departure to the destined point of arrival. The defendants must, at any rate, be deemed liable from the place where
they received the passenger to the place where she was to be
transferred to the next agent in the course of transmission to the
place of her destination.
These views seem to be in accordance with the general principles of law established in similar cases.
The proprietors of a
railroad, as passenger carriers, are bound to the most exact care
and diligence, not only in the management of their trains and
cars, but also in the structure and care of their track, and
in all subsidiary arrangements necessary to the safety of passengers: .tlfc.Elroy v. The Nashua & -Lowell Railroad Company,
4 Cush. 400. Assdredly, a safe passage-way to and from the
cars is a subsidiary arrangement which passengers have a right to
require to be safe. The wharf was this passage-way for those
going to the boat from the cars or coming to the cars from the
boat. A railway company, for the more convenient access of
passengers between the two platforms of a station, erected
across the line a wooden bridge, which the jury found to be
dangerous; Jheld, that the company were liable for the death
of the passenger, through the faulty construction of this bridge,
although there was a safer one about one hundred yards further
round, which the deceased might have used: Longmore v. Cr. W.
Railway Co., 115 E. 0. L. R. 183. In Nicholson v. L. & Y.
Railway Co., 3 Hurlst. & Colt. 534, the plaintiff sued the defendants, common carriers, for not sufficiently lighting their depot,
and for not providing proper and sufficient accommodation for
their passengers to depart safely from their station after their
arrival, and for leaving hampers in the way of passengers departing, over which the plaintiff falling was injured. The facts were
these. The plaintiff, a passenger by the defendants' railway, was
set down at T., after dark, on the side of the line opposite to the
station and the place of egress. The train was detained more
than ten minutes at T. and, from its length, blocked up the ordi-
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nary crossing to the station, which is on the level. The ticket
collector stood near the crossing with a light, telling passengers
to "pass on."
The plaintiff passed down the train, to pass
behind it,and, from the want of light, stumbled over some hampers put out of the train, and was injured. The practice of passengers had been to cross behind the train, when long, without
interference from the railway company :-.--Ield, that these facts
disclosed evidence for the jury of negligence on the part of the
company. In Jlartinv. The areat N. Railway Co., 30 E. L. &
Eq. 473, the defendants, sued as common carriers, were held
liable for so negligently managing and lighting their station, that
the plaintiff, being a passenger by the railway, was thrown down,
while on his way to the carriages. In Hureh v. Concord Railroad
Corporation, 29 N. H. 9, it was held that the owners of railroads,.
which are public highways, are bound to make such landings and
places of access to their roads, as are necessary for the public
accommodation, and to keep them in a suitable- and safe state for
the accommodation of persons who may reasonably be expected
to use them. In Penn. Railraad Co. v. Henderson, 51 Penn.
(1 Smith) 815, the rilroad corporation was held liable, as common carriers, for an injury occasioned by not having a safe and
convenient platform, the court terming the want of such platform
"an imperfection or defect in the road." So the ferryman is
bound to have his landing in a complete state of repair for the
reception of travellers, and to furnish proper easements for entering the boat, and to provide fastenings to keep the boat in a firm
and steady position while passengers are being received: Cohen
v. -ume, 1 McCord (S. 0.) 439.
Indeed, natural persons, who assume no public duties, are
held liable if they suffer their property to remain in a condition
dangerous to the public: E-lliot v. Pray, 10 Allen 378. In Corby
v. Hill, 93 E. C. L. R. 556, the defendant was held liable in tort
for negligently placing and leaving an obstruction in the private
avenue, known to be used in the ordinary way, whereby a passer
lawfully using it, though having no permanent right of way, was
injured. In Packard v. Smith, 100 E. 0. L. R. 468, the refreshment-rooms and a coal-cellar at a railway station were let by the
company to one S., the opening for putting jn coals being on the
arrival platform. A train coming in while the servants of a coal
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merchant were shooting coals into the cellar for S., the plaintiff,
a passenger, whilst passing in the usual way out of the station,
without fault of his own, fell into the cellar opening which the
coal merchant's servants had left insufficiently guarded. Held,
that S., the occupier of the refreshment rooms and cellar, was
responsible for this negligence. Much more is it the duty of
railway companies to the public using their railway, to keep the
approaches thereto safe and free from obstruction at all points
where freight 6r passengers are received: 1 Redfield on Railroads
144. So a railway company is bound to fence the station that
the public may not be misled, by seeing a place unfenced, into
injuring themselves by passing that way, being the shortest to
the station: Burgess v. The Great N. T. Railway Co., 95 E. 0.
L. R. 923.
4. The damages assessed by the jury are large. Different
individuals would vary in their estimate of what would be a just
pecuniary compensation for bodily pain and suffering. "It is
one thing," observes Mr. Justice STORY, in Thurston v. Martin,
1 Mason 197, "for a court to administer its own measure of
damages in a case properly before it, and quite another thing to
set aside the verdict of the jury because it exceeds that measure."
The damages given are not so excessive as to require or justify
our interference.
5. Under instructions of the presiding justice, deemed unexceptionable, the jury have found the defendants guilty of negligence.
The question was one properly for their determination. The law
makes them judges of fact. It is not enough or the court to be
satisfied that they should have come to a different conclusion to
authorize it to be set aside. As was remarked by ERLE, C. J.,
in Longmore v. G. Vf. Railway Co., 115 E. C. L. R. 183, in
reference to the safety of a, bridge: "I think the judge clearly
would not have been justified in taking upon himself as matter
of law to determine as to the propriety of its construction, and
withdraw that question from the jury." So, too, in the same
ease, KEATING, J., says: "No doubt the jury might, if so minded,
have found that there was no negligence on the part of the company. And it certainly seemed to me there was a strong case
for the company." Yet the verdict was sustained. There is no
such proof of misconduct that imperatively demands the verdict
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to be set aside. The law has made the jury the judges to determine whether the defendants have been negligent or not, and to
their determination the defendants must submit.
Exceptions and motion overruled.
KENT, WALTON, BARROWS, and DANFORTH, JJ.,' concurred.
There are several points brought out
in the foregoing opinion which seem to
us of considerable practical importance ;
and which, although largely discussed
in many other cases, have not always
been so definitely passed upon.
I. The precise point here decided in
regard to coupon-tickets for different
roads and sold at the office of one, where
the passenger goes upon the line, is, that
the rights of the passenger and the duty
of the several companies are precisely
the same as if the tickets had been purchased at the office of each road. This
is perfectly definite and intelligible and
at the same time just and. reasonable.
It seems to us impossible for any party
interested in such transactions, to raise
any fair and-just objection to the rule as
here declared, so far as the passenger
transportation is concerned. The companies could certainly expect nothing
less. And it is difficult to present #ny
theory of duty or demand on the part
of the companies or thb passenger, which
will give the passenger any further security or indemnity consistent with established legal principles.
2. The responsibility of passenger

carriers is expressed in rather more
moderate terms than we have of late felt
was consistent with the advancing exigencies of the business. As the number
of passengers and the peril of transportation has been largely increased since
the introduction of railways, it seems but
just and reasonable to demand of the
companies every precaution to insure
safety, which is known and in use in the
business, whether the expense would be
consistent with profit or not. And if
companies undertake to carry passengers
without these precautions, all hazard
should fall upon them, unless the passenger is himself in fault, or the injury
occurred wholly without fault or defect
of appliances on the part of the company.
3. The rule that the reslonsibility of
one company continues until the safe
delivery of its passengers to the custody
and responsibility of the next carrier on
the advancing line is clearly just and
reasonable, and it has also the merit of
clearness and definiteness, and is in
strict analogy to the duty of common
carriers of goods.
I. F. R.

THE STATE v. PEPPER.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
THE STATE EX REL. McCARTY ET AL. v. PEPPER ET AL'
Whenever an act is done or a statement made by a party which cannot be contradicted or contravened without fraud on his part and injury to others whose conduct has been influenced by the act or admission, the character of an estoppel will
attach to what would otherwise be mere evidence; the estoppel being limited within such bounds as are sufficient to put those who have dealt on the faith of appearances that turn out to be incorrect, in the same position with reference to the
author of such appearances as if they were true.
When a bond has been signed and delivered to the principal obligor by a surety,
upon the condition that others not named in the instrument shall sign before it is
delivered to the obligee, and it is delivered without such signatures being obtained,
and received by the obligee without notice of such condition or circumstances which
should put him upon inquiry, the condition imposed will not avail the surety.
This is not a question of the power of the principal to deliver the bond in its apparently perfect condition, but simply a question of estoppel.
The principal obligor in a sheriff's official bond is not the agent of the board of
county commissioners (whose duty it is to approve the bond) in procuring its execution.
A surety signing and delivering to the principal obligor for delivery to the obligee
a bond, before the names of the sureties have been inserted in the body of the insirument, will be held as agreeing that the blank for such names may be filled
after he has executed it.
A surety signed a sheriff's official bond after the signatures of other sureties,
without reading it, or hearing it read, or asking what it was, on being told by-the
principal that it was a county paper and requested by him to sign it.
Held, that such surety was not released by the fact that one of the signatures
before his was forged.

T.is was an action upon the official bond of Michael Batzner,
treasurer of Franklin county, for a failure to pay over money
collected for the state as such treasurer.
There was an answer setting up the following points of defence:First. Putting in issue the execution and delivery of the bond.'
Second. The fact of the supposed bond being intrusted to a
special agent for the special purpose only of delivering this supposed bond, when certain conditions should be complied with, and
that he fraudulently handed the supposed bond over to the obligee
without authority.
Third. That after the supposed bond had been delivered to the
We are indebted for this case to the courtesy of T. B. Black, Esq, State Reportcr.-ED. A. L. R.
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obligee, there were material alterations made in it without the
knowledge or consent of the obligors, which avoided the bond.
Fourth. Upon the plea of those who signed after the bond was
delivered. to the obligee, that they were induced to sign and deliver it by fraud; and that they would not have signed or delivered
it if they had known that it had before been delivered; and that
their signing made a material alteration in it unknown to them
after delivery.
Fifth. That when the bond was delivered by the obligors they
all, except Batzner and Grinkemeyer, supposed that the signatures of all the obligors who purported to have signed it were
genuine, and if they had known that any of the signatures were
forged, they would not have delivered the bond; whereas, in fact,
one of the signatures, that of Grinkemeyer, was not genuine, but
a forgery.
The cause was submitted to the court for trial, and there was a
finding for the defendants.
The evidence was as follows:Grinkemeyer testified, that he did not sign the bond or authorize any one to do it for him. (Judgment had been rendered in
his favor upon the ground that his signature was a forgery.)
Clar.-Batzner wanted me to sign the bond. I told him he
knew that I was embarrassed and could do him no good. He said
he wanted to get one hundred names on the bond, and my name
might induce others to sign it. I was at tlW time insolvent.
Pepper.-Batznerasked me to sign his bond, and said I must
or will have one hundred names on it; cannot say which. I put
my name there because he said he must or would have one hundred names on it.
Oltel.-Batzner asked me to sign my name. I told him it was
of no use, that I had no property. He said that made no difference, that it was just for fun. He said that so the paper was
full it was right, I did not read it, nor did heread it to me. I
thought I was just signing for the character of the man. I cannot read English. He did not tell me what it was for; I supposed it was for the character of the man. I had no property at
the time.
Wi1tt.-Have lived in this county twenty-three years. Knew
Batzner. I signed the bond at my-house. Balzner brought a
paper to me; I didn't ask what it was, but signed it; didn't

THE STATE v. PEPPER.

read it; Batzner said, here, Witt, is a county paper, sign it. I
didn't ask him what it was, but signed it; he didn't read it to me.
Ofartin.-Batzner asked me to sigr the paper. I asked him
what it was for. He told me it was for his treasurer's bond. I
hesitated, and he then told me I need have no fears, for he would
have one hundred good men on it before he attempted to file it.
ilfoorman.-Was sheriff, &c.; saw the bond the day the commissioners met. They met in the auditor's office. There was no
court in session. There was a blank in the body of the bondno names except Batzner's, nor any date to it. The blank was
filled up after it was approved by Archy Herndon, by the insertion of the names of the sureties.
Buckinglham.-Batzner asked f'me if Mr. D. D. Jones had seen
me about his surety bond. I told him he had. I asked him if
M r. Jones and Dr. George Berry had signed it. He said they
had not, but were going to; that he had been to see Dr. Berry,
and he had promised to come and sign the bond; that he intended
to get one hundred names, the best men in the county. I then
signed the bond. I asked if Dr. Berry and Dan Jones were certain to go on the bond. He said they were. I was induced to
sign the bond by these statements, and knowing that Jones and
Berry were leading men in the county, and were well acquainted.
My understanding was that Batzner was to get the names before
the commissioners met, and the bond was then to go to the commissioners.
Berry.-Batzner asked me to sign the bond. I asked him if
he had redeemed his pledge he had made as to the number of the
men to be on the bond, which was, that he should have one hun* dred good men on the bond. He said he had not, but would get
them. I told him to get ninety-nine and I would be the one hundredth. I did not then sign the bond. The day I signed it he came
to me and pressed my signing it. I asked him if he had got the
names; and he said he had not, but intended to get them. I told
him that was his pledge, and I did not want to go on until he had
got them. He said he wanted to get some names in the country,
and did not want to go to get them until he had got the names
of his acquaintances in town. I told him I would sign with the
understanding that I was to be on if there were one hundred good
names on the bond. I signed it, and left it with him, with that
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understanding. I left it with him to be delivered when he got
one hundred good men on it.
SW7fer.-Batzner came back with a paper in his hand and
asked me if I did not want to sign it? I asked him for what ?
He said he wanted one hundred men on it for recommendation.
He said, You must not be afraid to sign your name. I said if it
was nothing else but a recommendation I would do it. I did not
read it; it was folded up. I saw nothing written or printed on
it. He did not read it to me. I can't read English. I did not
ask him to read it to me. I did not know it was a bond. Saw
no names on it. Would not have signed it had I known it was a
bond. He did not speak of any other paper, or names to a paper,
until after I had signed it. During that evening he told me he
had a bond filled out at Brooliville with sixty names on it.
Stoops.-I was one of the commissioners at the time this bond
was approved, and was in attendance. It was a special meeting,
called to approve the bonds. When it was first presented I objected that there were not names enough on it. Batzner took it
out and got King, West, and others to sign it. Don't recollect
whether Grinkemeyer's name was on when he brought it back, or
not. Can't say whether it had been filledup with names and'
dates at the time he brought it back, or not.
ffyatt.-I was commissioner when this bond was approved, and
was present when first presented. It was rejected,- only a portion
of these names being on it. The balance of the signatures were
procured same day and within a short time. Think that after it
was objected to, all the names, from Johnson down, were put on
it. Grinkemeyer's name was brought in; it had not been on
before. Don't know whether it was filled up before approval, or.
not. When first presented the bond was objected to. Batzner
took it out and got on it the name of Johnson and those names
below
his.
Other
parties-who had signed the bond testified to
the same
effect.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
RAY, J.-The question presented in this court is upon the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the finding.
In the case of -Deardorffv. Poresman,24 Ind. 481, 5 Am. Law
Reg. N. S. 539, the question presented in this-case upon the lia-
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bility of the sureties, where the bond has been delivered by them
to the principal upon condition that others not named in the bond
should sign before the bond was delivered to the obligee, and such
delivery was made without such signatures being obtained and
received by the obligee in good faith, was examined; and it was
held that where "1the surety places the instruxment, perfect upon
its face, in the hands of the proper person to pass it to the obligee,
the law justly holds that the apparent authority with which the
surety has clotlied him shall be regarded as the real authority,
and as the condition imposed upon the delivery was unknown to
the obligee, therefore the benefit of such condition shall not avail
the surety."
This decision was approved in Webb v. Baire, 27 Ind. 368;
and in Blackwell v. The State, 26 Id. 204, where it was held that
the principal obligor was not the agent of the board of commissioners. This entirely disposes of the plea of a special agency.
The special agent is clothed with the apparent authority to make
an unconditional delivery of the bond, and the obligee, uninformed
of the condition imposed, is authorized to receive the bond thus
delivered. Nothing short of absolute notice to the obligee, or
circumstances which should put him upon inquiry, and therefore
imply notice, can avoid this rule. It is not, as stated in The
People v. Bostwick, 32 N. Y. 445, a question of the power of the
principal to deliver the bond in its apparently perfect condition,
but simply a question of estoppel. The surety signs an instrument complete on its face, and delivers it to the principal to pass
over to the obligee; if he impose any condition upon his delivery
he must rely upon the.principal to execute that condition, for he
has made him his agent for the general purpose of a delivery, and
has clothed him with the indicia of such agency. The obligee
accepts an instrument, perfect in form and execution, which comes
to him from the person who should have possession of the instrument for the purpose of such delivery. The entire transaction,
so far as the obligee is involved, is according to the ordinary and
natural course. The surety, however, while he executes the
instrument and places it in the usual channel for delivery, departs
from the ordinary course of proceeding by circumscribing the
general authority by a condition unknown to the obligee. The
condition is disregarded; a fraud is accomplished; and he who has
not scrupled to trust his principal with the semblance of a general
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authority to make the delivery must stand the hazard he has
incurred.
A much broader scope has been given to the doctrine of estoppels
in pais, both in this country and in England, than formerly obtained; and it is now established that whenever an act is done or
a statement made by a party, which cannot be contradicted or
contravened without fraud on his part and injury to others whose
conduct has been influenced by the act or admission, the character
of an estoppel will attach to what would otherwise be mere evidence. The estoppel must obviously be limited within such
bounds as are sufficient to put the party who has dealt on the
faith of appearances that turn out to be incorrect, in the same
po~ition with reference to the author of such appearances as if
they were true. "The truthi is, courts have been for some time
favorable to the utility of the doctrine of estoppels, hostile to its
technicality :" 2 Smith Lead. Cas. 460; Smith v. NYewton, 38 Ill.
230; Knoebel v. Kircher, 33 fI1. 308.
It is intimated by Judge REDFIELD in a note to the case of The
York Co. Ht. F. Insurance Co. v. Brooks, 3 Law Reg. (N. S.)
403, that the English courts have denied the application of the
rule to this class of cases, that he who by his culpably negligent
act enables his agent to commit a fraud to the prejudice of third
persons, is estopped from denying the actual authority of the
agent, and the cases of Swan v. The North British, &c., Co., 10
Jur. N. S. 102, and Patclin v. Dubbins, 23 Eng. L. & Eq. R.
609, are cited as authority for the remark.
In the case Jeardorff v. Poresman, supra, we examined the
first case cited, and .the result proved that his conclusions were
not sustained by that authority. The case cited of Patchmn v.
DuSbins, was where a vendor of land covenanted that no building
except toinbs should be erected on any part of his land opposite
to the land sold. Sulsequently the vendor.sold part of the land
on the other side of the road, and the purchaser built thereon.
NIo objection was made to the building erected, as it did not intercept the view of the first vendee. Subsequently another part of
the land was sold and buildings about to be erected when the original purchaser filed a bill to enjoin the building; but the court
dismissed the bill, holding that the true meaning of the covenant
was that it extended only to so much of the lanas of the original
vendor as were exactly opposite to the land sold to the plaintiff.
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If this decision is a denial of the application made in this
country of the rule referred to, the English Court of Appeal in
Chancery has evinced so much delicate consideration for the
American courts that its line of departure from their rulings
cannot be traced.
But since the decision of this court in the .Deardorff case, the
question there considered has been before the Supreme Court of
the state of Maine, and has received a like solution: State v. Peck,
53 Maine 284.. This decision, published in the year following the
case in this court, reviewing as it does the same line of authority,
supporting itself by the same. decisions and arguments which
approved themselves to us, renders it unnecessary that we should
do more than quote the result reached. "A bond, perfect upon
its face, apparently duly executed by all whose names appear
therein, purporting to be signed, sealed, and delivered by the
several obligors, and actually delivered by the principal, without
stipulation, reservation, or condition, cannot be avoided by the
sureties upon the ground that they signed it on the condition that
it should not be delivered unless it should be executed by other
persons, who did not execute it, when it appears that the obligee
had no notice of such condition, and nothing to put him upon
inquiry as to the manner of its execution, and also that he has
been induced, upon the faith of such bond, to act to his own
prejudice."
Before passing from this portion of the case it may be well to
add a remark to our comments made in the -Deardorfcase upon
the decision in the Supreme Court of the United States in Pawling v. The UJnited States, 4 Cranch 219. The action was upon
an appeal bond given by Ballinger and signed by Pawling, Todd,
Adair and Kennedy as his sureties, who pleaded that they delivered the same as an escrow to one Joseph Ballinger, to be safely
kept upon condition that if Simon Ingleman and William Patton,
named on the face of the bond, should execute the same as cosureties, then the bond should be delivered to the agent of the
United States, otherwise not. There was an issue upon this'averment of a delivery as an escrow, and the question was presented
to the court upon a demurrer to the evidence introduced by the
defendants. Without commenting upon the allegation that an
instrument not fully executed was delivered as an escrow, we cite
a paragraph from the opinion of Chief Justice MARSHALL: "It
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is also of some importance that the defendant Todd had previously declared that he would not be apprehensive of becoming a
security for Ballinger, provided others whom he named should
-also-become securities, and that he inserted the names of the others
in the bond in the presence of the witness."
When it is considered that this is the original decision upon
which all the cases rest, *hich assume to release the surety from
liability when the name of his co-surety does not appear on the
face of the instrument, the entire want of authority to justify
their departure from sound principle can be appreciated.
The evidence in the case in judgment did not authorize the
finding that the sureties were released because others did not sign
the bond as co-sureties.
There remain but two questions. Of these there can be nothing
predicated on the fact that the bond was not accepted upon its first
presentation to the board of commissioners. No formal action
was taken by the board at that time, but it remained in session
to act upon the bond when presented, and the names of the sureties were left blank in the body of the instrument for the very
purpose of procuring names sufficient to satisfy the board. A
party signing and delivering an instrument in this condition must
be held as agreeing that the blanks may be thus filled after he
has executed it, and the evidence introduced shows full authority
given to the principal to procure such signatures -as he secured:
Inhabitantsof South Berwick v. Huntress, 53 Maine 89; Smith
v. Crooker, 5 Mass. 588; Hudson v. BRevett, 5 Bing. 368; -Eagleton v. Gutteridge, 11 M. & W. 466.
The rule as stated in 1 vol. Leading Cases in Equity 157, in
the note to Dearingv. Earlof Wincheisea, is, "1that where a note
with the names of certain persons upon it, who stood in the relation of co-sureties for the maker, has been offered for discount,
and not being satisfactory, the name of another person has been
pro.cured, who also became a surety for the maker, all these persons are co-sureties with one another, and subject to mutual contribution, though the earliest sureties had no knowledge of the last
becoming a surety." The cases fully sustain this doctrine: Stout
v. Vauze, 1 Robinson (Va.) 169; Warner v. Price, 8 Wend. 397;
Nortor v. Coons, 3 Denio 130; s. c., 2 Selden 33'; 'Woodworth v.
Bowers, 5 Ind. 277; Sesson v. Barrett,6 Barb. 199; s. c., 2
Com. 406; McNeil *. Sandford, 3 B. Monroe 11.
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The cases o. O'.Areale v. Long, 4 Cranch 60, and of Ifarper v.
The State, 7 Blkf. 61, if to be sustained, must rest on the fact
that a perfect instrument had been delivered by the original sureties, fully executed and filled up, and that the names of other
.sureties were afterwards inserted in the body of the instrument
without the consent of such original sureties. Here the space
was left blank for the very purpose of inserting the names of all
who might sign the bond.
The name of 'Grinkemeyer, however, was forged to the bond;
but this was the last name signed except that of Witt, and as the
signatures preceding Grinkemeyer were in no way procured by
the forgery, they cannot be released thereby. The supreme confidence evinced by Witt in "county papers" will relieve him from
any suspicion of having been influenced to sign by any preceding,
names. Indeed, there are cases which would hold him as aflirming
the genuineness of the preceding signatures: York Co. H. F. Ins.
Co. v. Brooks, supra; Terry v. ifazlewood, 1 Duvall (Ky.) 104.
Tthe former decision in this case in 22 Ind. 399, is overruled
for the reasons given in Deardorffv. Foresman, Blackwell v. Te
State, Webb v. Baird, supra, and by the decision herein. It
should have been regarded by our courts as overruled by the first.
two cases cited.
The judgment is reversed, with costs, and the cause
remanded for a new trial.

United States Circuit Court, -Districtof Connecticut.
SEMMES,

ADIIINISTRATOR

Or LUCKETT, v. CITY

FIRE INSURANCE

.COMPANY.
The late rebellion was such a war as suspended the right of a citizen of Mississippi to sue on a policy of insurance in a Connecticut company.
In addition to this consequence of a state of war, the right to sue on such a Policy was suspended by the Proclamation of the President, of August 16th 1861.
Where a policy contained an express provision that in any action under it com-menced more than a year from the time of loss, the lapse of time should be con-.

clusire evidence against the validity of the claim, the period of the war must be
omitted in computing the year.
The condition of war existed as regards the state of Mississippi, at least from16th August 1861, when the President, in pursuance of the Act of Congrese of JulyVOL. XVII.-4a
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13th 1861, declared that state in insurrection. 'Whether the war commenced, in
contemplation of law, before that date, not decided.
"The legal period of the termination of the war depends not on the continuance
or cessation of active hostilities, but on the acts of the departments of the government to which political powers are intrusted. The Proclamation of the President of
June 13th 1865, removing the restrictions on trade as to the states theretofore in
insurrection, was a valid act of recognition by the executive department of the
government of the termination of the war, and the right of plaintiff in this action,
to sue, revived from that date.

THIS was a suit on a policy of insurance against fire issued to
William R. Luckett, of Mississippi, dated August 3d 1860, upon
a building situated at the Artesian Springs, Madison county, in
that state. It was conceded that a total loss occurred on the 5th
of January 1861, and during the life of the policy,-that the
assured subsequently died,- 2'and that the defendants are liable to
his administrator in this suit, unless the right to recover is barred
by lapse of time.
Suit was commenced October 31st 1866, and defendants pleaded
the following condition of the policy: " It is furthermore expressly provided, that no suit or action of any kind against said
company, for the recovery of any claim upon, or by virtue of this
policy, shall be sustainable in any court of law or chancery, unless
such suit or action shall be commenced within the term of twelve
months next after any loss or damage shall occur; and in case
any such suit or action shall be commenced against said company
after the expiration of twelve months next after such loss or damage shall have occurred, the lapse of time shall be taken and
deemed conclusive evidence against the validity of the claim
thereby so attempted to be enforced."
Plaintiff replied (among other matters not important in the view
taken by the court), that the assured, down to the time of his
death, was a resident and citizen of the state of Mississippi, and
that the plaintiff, during his whole life, has been and still is a resident and citizen of the same state. That from April 15th 1861,
to April 2d 1866, a state of war between the so-called Confederate States, including the state of Mississippi, ant the United
States, existed, whereby all right of the assured during his life,
and of his administrator since his death, to maintain any action
against the defendants, was by law suspended; during all that
time.

4

This replication the defendants have traversed.
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By stipulation the case was tried by the court instead of the
jury.

William Hamersley &"1. X. Vf. Welch, for plaintiff.
C. 1?. Ctapman and A. P. Hyde, for defendants.
SHIPMAN, ".-[After stating the facts and disposing of some
preliminary questions.]-The replication sets up the late rebellion,
and alleges that a state of war existed between the organization
known as the Confederate States, including the state of Mississippi, and the United States, from the 15th of April 1861, to the
2d of April 1866, whereby it is claimed that this contract and all
light to sue upon it was, during all that time, suspended. There
is no allegation that the courts of Mississippi, or the national
courts in that state, were closed for any specific length of-time,
nor that the plaintiff, or his intestate, labored under any personal
disability arising out of his actual participation in the war, nor
that he was under the control of any vis major, beyond what the
law implies from the state of war. The whole question, therefore, turns on the legal consequences of the war in their operation on this contract, and the length of time these consequences
continued.
It is, of course, conceded that a state of war, recognised as
such by and between the belligerent parties, suspends all contracts
in existence between the citizens of the respective belligerents at
the time the war commences. The authorities are uniform on this
subject. The general rile is well stated by Mr. Justice NELSoN
in the Prize Cases, 2 Black 687. "The legal consequences
resulting from a state of war between two countries at this day,
are well understood, and will be found described in every approved
work on the subject of international law. The people of the two
countries become immediately the enemies of each other,-all
intercourse, commercial or otherwise, between them unlawful,all contracts existing at the commencement of the war suspended,
and all made during its existence utterly void." This doctrine
iias been repeatedly recognised and applied to our late civil war
by the courts of this- country, both state and national: Hanger v.
Abbott, 5 Wall. 532; Tucker v. Watson, 15 Am. Law Reg. 22;
Jackson Ins. Co. v. Stewart, Id. 732; Conn. HIut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Hall, 16 Id. 606.

676

SEMMES v. INSURANCE CO.

It is equally well settled that, upon the termination of the war,
obligations contracted before its commencement, between the respective subjects, though the remedy for their recovery is suspended during the war, are revived: Lawrence's Wheaton, p. 877,
and the cases above cited. In Hranger v. Abbott, and Jackson
Ins. Co. v. Stewart, this doctrine was applied to the Statutes of
Limitation. In the former case, Mr. Justice CLIFFORD, speaking
for the court, says: "When a debt has not been confiscated, the
rule undoubtedly is that the right to sue revives on the restoration
of peace, and Mr. Chitty says that with the return of peace we
return to the creditor the right and the remedy. Unless we
return the remedy with the right, the pretence of restoring the
latter is a mockery, as the power to exercise it with effect is gone
by lapse of time during which both the right and the remedy were
suspended."
Applying these doctrines to the present case, it follows that the
war, in which the people of Mississippi on one side, and those of
Connecticut on the other, participated, suspended this contract
with all its incidents, including the condition set up in bar of this
action, and all rights of action under it. In view of the result to
which I have come, it is unnecessary to determine the precise date
of the beginning of the war, when this suspension commenced.
It is immaterial whether we take the 15th of April, as stated in
the replication, the date of the President's prpclamation calling
for volunteers; or the 19th of April, when by proclamation he
declared that an insurrection had broken out in certain states,
including Mississippi, and declared his purpose to blockade their
ports; or the 16th of August 1861, when in pursuance of the Act
of Congress of July 13th 1861, he, by proclamation, formally
declared the inhabitants of those states in insurrection, and
announced the prohibition of all commercial intercourse between
them and the inhabitants of the other parts of the United States.
It is conceded on all hands that at least from August 16th 1861,
this contract was suspended, both by the inevitable legal effect of
the state of war, and by the interdiction of intercourse announced
by the proclamation of that date. The rules of public law, as
well as the Act of Congress referred to, lead to this result.
Therefore, as the twelve months within which a suit could be
legally brought on this policy had not expired -when the war commenced, and thus imposed a disability on the assured, it becomes
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essential to determine whether this disability has been removed,
and if so, when that removal took place. It is conceded in this
case that the disability has been removed, and the right to sue
revived. The plaintiff not only admits, but musi. maintain, that
this took place before October 31st 1866, when he brought this
suit. Otherwise he could have no standing in court. As the contract and all remedies under it were absolutely suspended by the
war, no suit could have been brought while that suspension continued. But the plaintiff goes further, and alleges, in effect, in
his replication, that the war ended, so far as the state of Mississippi and its inhabitants are concerned, on the 2d of April 1866,
the date of the President's proclamation to that effect, and not
before. On the other hand, the defendants insist that it ended as
early as June 13th 1865, when the President, by proclamation,
appointed a provisional governor over the state of Mississippi, and
directed the United States district judge for that judicial district
to proceed to hold the courts.
Now, it must be remembered, that though this was a war between
belligerents, attended while it continued by those legal consequences which public law always attaches to all legitimate warfare,
yet it was a civil war in which the revolted party was defeated,
and its organization as a de facto government under the name of
the Confederate States of America, politically annihilated. No
treaty of peace in the ordinary sense of that term could be negotiated, as but one of the parties which had waged the wai was in
existence as a treaty-making power at its close. Therefore no
such treaty has drawn the line where the war ended, and suspended
contracts revived. We must therefore look to the acts of the
only surviving party to ascertain when those disabilities, legally
imposed by the state of war, ceased. It is hardly necessary for
me to say that the principle here stated lends no support to the
doctrine put forth in some quarters, and which that distinguished
jurist, Mr. Justice SPRAGUE, characterized as a "grave and dangerous error,"-that the suppression of the rebellion conferred
upon the United States the rights of conquest,-the right to treat
the states included in the rebellion as foreign territory acquired
by arms, and permanently divest them and their inhabitants of all
political privileges: Sprague's Decisions, II., p. 147. That notion
has nothing to do with the point now under -consideration. The
United States, in suppressing the rebellion, destroyed the political
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organization known as the Confederate States, and not the individual states as political communities. But though the states
remained after the contest ended, the belligerent power known as
the Confederate States which had represented them in the war,
disappeared at its close. Neither of the states which remained
had the power, or attempted, to negotiate a treaty of peace with
the United States. -In determining, therefore, when the rights,
suspended by the war, revived, we must look to the action of the
only power in existence which could effectually deal with that
subject. This power was the government of the United States.
It is a settled rule with the courts of the United States, in
ascertaining whether or not war exists, to look to the action of
those departments of the government to which that subject is confided by the Constitution. Courts never inquire, when investigating questions of this character, when active hostilities ceased.
The termination of war, and the establishment of the relations of
peace, are political acts, to be performed exclusively by the departments of the government to which political powers and duties
are intrusted. The action of these departments, when within the
authority conferred by the Constitution, is conclusive and binding
on the courts as well as citizens. When war has existed between
the United States and a foreign country, its termination is easily
ascertained by a reference to the treaty of peace which follows
it, and which is consummated by the President acting by and
with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. As no
such treaty did, or could, mark the close of this civil war, we
must look to the action of the President, or Congress, or both,
and from that action ascertain when the war ended, and when the
legal consequences which flowed from it ceased to act in any given
case.
I have already .hown that by the rules of public law universally recognised among civilized nations, as well as by the decisions of our own courts, the existence of this war suspended all
contracts between the citizens of the respective belligerents,
entered into before it commenced. It rendered, for the time
being, all commercial intercourse between the citizens of two sections unlawful, and converted them into enemies. But in addition
to this, Congress passed an act, July 18th 1861, authorizing the
President in certain cases, by proclamation; to declare the inhabitants of a state in insurrection against the United States, where-
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upon all commercial intercourse by and between the same and the
citizens thereof and the citizens of the rest of the United States
should become unlawful. In pursuance of this statute the President, on the 16th of August 1861, issued his proclamation declaring the inhabitants of certain states, including Mississippi, in
insurrection against the United States. By force of this proclamation, then, and the statute authorizing it, as well as by the
legal effect of the war then existing, all pre-existing contracts
between the pdople of the respective belligerents, in6luding the
right to enforce them by judicial proceedings, were thenceforth
suspended. In progress of time hostilities ceased, and the execfutive department of the United States commenced a series of
acts recognising a change in the relations of the government
towards the inhabitants of the states lately in rebellion. May 22d
1865, the President issued a proclamation raising the blockade of
most of the closed ports, and removing "all.restrictions upon trade
heretofore imposed in the territory of the United States east of
the Mississippi river, save those relating to contraband of war, to
the reservation of the rights of the United States to property purchased in the territory of an enemy, and to the 25 per cent. upon
purchases of cotton." The same proclamation declared that all
provisions of the internal revenue law should be carried into effect
by the proper officers.
May 29th 1865, the President proclaimed amnesty and pardon
to all persons in the late revolted states6 except certain specified
classes, with restoration of all rights of property, except slaves,
and in cases where legal proceedings had been commenced for the
confiscation of property of persons engaged in rebellion, on condition that they should take and subscribe a certain oath.
On the same day he issued a proclamation appointing a provisional governor for North Carolina, and prescribing his duty and
authority.
June 18th 1865, he issued a similar proclamation relating to
Mississippi.
On the same day he issued a proclamation appointing a provisional governor over Tennessee, and declaring, among other things,
"1that all restrictions upon internal, domestic, and coastwise intercourse and trade, and upon the removal of the products of states
heretofore declared in insurrection, reserving and excepting only
those relating to contraband of war, as hereinafter recited, and
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also those which relate to the reservation of rights of the United
States to property purchased in the territory of an enemy, heretofore imposed on the territory of the United States east of the
Mississippi river, are annulled, and I do hereby direct that they
be forthwith removed." The other provisions of this proclamation
it is not necessary to notice here.
April 2d 1866, the President issued a proclamation formally
declaring the insurrection that had existed in certain states,
including Mississippi, at an end, and to be thenceforth so regarded.
It should be remarked that there was no executive declaration
that the insurrection was ended, before that of April 2d 1866, in
any state except Tennessee. On the 13th of June 1865, he did,
in the proclamation already cited, declare it terminated in the
last-named state. In a proclamation of the same date relating to
Misssssippi, and in the one of May 29th 1865, relating to North
Carolina, he spoke of the armed forces of the rebellion as having
been "almost entirely overcome."
We must now inquire into the legal character of the proclamations of the President restoring commercial intercourse to and
with the states which had been engaged in the rebellion, and the
rest of the United States. And, first, as to his authority to issub
such proclamations. I think there can be no doubt on that pointThe Supreme Court of the United States recognised the. power
of the President to, in pffect, declare the inhabitants of the disaffected states in a state of insurrection as early as April 19th
1861, when he set on foot the blockade of certain ports, including
those in Mississippi (The .Prize Cases, 2 Black 670). In the opinion in these cases, Mr. Justice GRIER, speaking for a majority of
the court, says :-" Whether the President, in fulfilling his duties
as commander-in-chief, in suppressing an insurrection, has met
with such armed hostile resistance, and a civil war of such alarming proportions, as will compel him to accord to them the character
of belligerents, is a question to be decided bi him, an(f this court
must be governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the government to which this power was intrusted. He
must determine what degree of force the crisis demands. The
proclamation of blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence
to the court that a state of war existed which demanded and
authorized a recourse to such a measure, under the peculiar cir-
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cumstances of the case." There had been no declaration of war.
Congress can alone declare war, but the court held in the same
cases that that body could not declare war against a state, or any
number of states, by virtue of any clause in the Constitution. It
also held that the President had no power to declare or initiate a
war either against a foreign nation, or a domestic state. It, however, distinctly decided that the President could, and did, recognise a state of war as actually existing, and that the courts were
bound to accept such iecognition of the fact as conclusive. Of
course they must recognise the legal consequences which flow from
the state of war. It would seem to follow that if the President
has the power to recognise the state of war as an existing fact,
and this recognition is binding on the courts, he must equally
have the power to recognise a state of peace as an existing
fact, and the courts are equally bound by such recognition.
Especially would this seem to be the case in this civil war, where
no formal treaty of peace could mark the line where war ended
and peace commenced, and where there was no declaration of the
legislature inconsistent with the proclamation of the Executive.
But whether this is the true doctrine or not, it must be remembered that the Act of Congress of July 18th 1861., authorized
the President to declare certain states in insurrection, whereupon
all commercial intercourse was to become unlawful. On the 16th
of August following he issued such a proclamation. From that
time forward the interdiction of commercial intercourse had the
double sanction of public law and a special Act of Congress
operating from the -date of the proclamation. *Now, it may be
said with some force, that inasmuch as commercial intercourse
became unlawful under this Act of Congress, ipso facto, on the
declaration of the President of the fact of insurrection, it must
have continued unlawful until the insurrection was by him, or
Congress, declared ended; and that, therefore, he could not
legalize free intercourse between the citizens of the two sections,
without first declaring the rebellion suppressed. But this would
be a very narrow and technical view to take of a great public
question, relating to an anomalous condition of public affairs, and
bearing upon interests of infinite diversity and great magnitude.
The Act of July 13th 1861, by its express terms, was to be operative as an interdiction of intercourse, only through a proclamation of the President. Congress left it to his discretion to put
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the interdiction in force. I think, by fair implication, it left with
him the power to withdraw it. There were reasons of the highest
public import why this power should remain with him. The war
had commenced during a recess of Congress. It was necessary
for the President to act promptly, and he called for troops, and
set on foot a blockade some time before Congress could assemble.
Hostilities might cease, and the war be substantially terminated,
also, during a recess of Congress, when prompt action by the
President might be of the highest importance both to our foreign
and domestic commerce. This power of the Executive to restore
pacific intercourse seems to have been practically conceded without dissent from any quarter. Neither Congress, nor the Executive, nor the people have acted upon the assumption that intercourse between the people of the two sections in private civil
affairs has been unlawful since June 13th 1865. On the contrary, by the common consent of all departments of the government, such intercourse was substantially free and unrestrained
after that date, as well as after the 2d of April 1866. Business
began to seek its old channels; new contracts were made; old
ones litigated and enforced in the courts of both sections, and
money invested at the South in various enterprises. No doubt
would ever have arisen as to the validity of the President's proclamation removing all restrictions upon ordinary pacific intercourse between the people, but for the subsequent struggle
between Congress and the executive department as to the political
status of the Southern States. But that controversy has no proper relation to the question now under consideration. Congress
has never, even by implication, declared commercial and pacific
intercourse of any kind unlawful, since the President assumed to
remove the restriction, June 13th 1865. On the contrary, its
silence on this subject, when legislating on the purely political
questions involved in what is called "Reconstruction," supports
the inference' that the ordinary civil pursuits of the people, and
all the rights incident to them, including the right to free intercourse between the citizens of both sections, and the right to
resort to legal civil remedies, were considered by Congress itself
as no longer under the ban of war. I am, therefore, satisfied
that the authority of the President to issue the proclamation of
June 13th 1865, restoring free intercourse, was full and amplei
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and that its exercise has been acquiesced in by the national
legislature.
We are next to consider what was the legal effect of that proclamation. Its language has already been cited. Beyond all
question, it embraces all contracts thereafter to be made, and
delivers them from the invalidating effect of public law, as well as
from the effect of the statute of July 13th 1861, and the proclamation made in pursuance thereof, August 16th following. Such
contracts being valid, the right to enforce them in the courts
necessarily followed. A citizen of one section could sue a citizen
of the other on such a contract without having his suit defeated
on the ground that it was-invalid either by public or statute law;
or abated under the plea of alien enemy. Both the right and the
remedy on such a contract were complete.
The question then arises, in what condition were the numerous
contracts existing when the war commenced, left by the proclamation of. June 13th 1865 ? Were they still suspended, and the
parties without any right to enforce them? Undoubtedly unpaid
debts contracted before the war could have been lawfully paid by
citizens of one section to those of the other, at any time after
,he date of this proclamation. This would be exercising one of
the privileges .of "domestic intercourse," restored in express
terms by that proclamation.
It would seem to follow that
the right to enforce payment through ordinary legal remedies
must have been restored also. It would be absurd to contend that
the proclamation removed the prohibition to enter into new contracts, and left those entered into before, and exiting at, the
commencement of the war, suspended. Such a distinction would
be unjust as well as absurd. It would be a distinction.between
rights of the same class, and could rest upon no principle of
natural justice, good sense, or sound policy. No such construction should be given to a state paper like this proclamation. It
was made in the interests of peace, and its ordinary beneficent
pursuits, and in furtherance of the rights of the people of both
sections of a common country. No possible advantage in the
way of convenience, interest, or security to the public or to individuals, consistent with justice, requires that its operation and
legal effect, should thus be contracted. It should, therefore,
receive a liberal rather than a narrow and technical interpretation.
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It follows from these principles, that the contract upon which
this suit is founded, though suspended during the war, while
intercourse between the citizens of the belligerent sections was
unlawful, revived on the 18th of June 1865, and from that date
was in full force. From that time there has been no legal obstacle to its enforcement. Whether .Mississippi was without civil
tribunals during any portion of the time since the contract
revived, is neither averred in the replication, nor was it proved
on the trial. This court cannot take judicial knowledge of that
point. But it is immaterial. The plaintiff could have resorted
to the state tribunals of Connecticut, or to this court, at any time
since his appointment as administrator. Not having brought his
suit within the time limited by the policy, exclusive of the whole
period of disability, the plea in bar is a conclusive answer to his
right to recover. Judgment must, therefore, be entered for the
defendants.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
SCHAFER v. THE FARMERS' AND MECHANICS' BANK OF
EASTON.
B. made a note payable to J. S. endorsed it: afterwards J. endorsed it and it
was discounted by a bank for J. Held, that S. was not liable either to the bank
or to J. without evidence dehors that he had assumed the liability.
The mere endorsement in such case did not authorize the holder to write a guaranty over it, but a special original agreement might be established by proof.
The payee, who was also an endorser, was incompetent to testify to such a special agreement of the irregular endorser.
The endorsement is not a note in writing, as required by the act of April 26th
1855 (Frauds).
The proof of a collateral liability for the debt of the maker different from that
which the endorsement imports cannot be made by parol. %
Taylor v. McCune, 1 Jones 460, and Keyner v. Shower, "l Harris 446, remarked
on.

ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton county.

This was an action of assumpsit by The Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank of Easton as holder, against Solomon Schafer,
as endorser of the following note:-

SCHAFER v. FARMERS' AND MECHANICS' BANK.

Nazareth, October 19th 1863.
"Sixty days after date I promise to pay to the order of
Jacob and Joseph Schafer, at The Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank
of Easton, Thirteen Hundred dollars, without defalcation for value
received.
"BENJAMIN SCHAFER."
"Endorsed-SOLOMON SCHAFER,
"$1300

" JACOB SCHAFER, Jr.,
"JOSEPH SCHAFER."

The first count of the declaration alleged an agreement by the
defendant to be accountable for the payment of the note if the
pfaintiffs would discount it for the payees. The second and third
counts charged the defendant as second Qndorser, alleging that
the payees were first endorsers. The declaration had also the
common counts.
On the trial before JONES, P. J., the plaintiffs proved the signatures of the drawer and all the endorsers of the note, notice to
all the endorsers, and the protest; also that the note was discounted by the plaintiffs on the 4th of November 1863, and the
proceeds paid to Jacob Schafer, Jr., and Joseph Schafer. They
further offered to prove that the defendant after the maturity
of the note admitted his liability on the note and asked time.
This offer was objected to, admitted, and a bill of exceptions
sealed. Mr. Foreman, cashier of the bank, testified that the
defendant wanted time on this note as well as on some others, the
bank agreed to give him time; shortly afterwards he came to
the bank and said he had been advised not to pay this note.
The plaintiffs then called Jacob Schafer, Jr., one of the payees
and endorsers, and offered to prove by him "the giving of the
note, the endorsement by S. Schafer, and the circumstances
attending it." The offer was objected to, admitted and a bill.
of exceptions sealed.
The witness testified that the note was given to the payees for
cattle sold by them to the drawer, the price of the cattle was to
be paid on the delivery, or a note given payable in bank with
good security; that the defendant agreed to become the surety,
and the note in suit was drawn; was signed by Benjamin Schafer,
endorsed by the defendant, and delivered to Joseph and Jacob
Schafer, Jr., with the understanding that the money was to be
obtained on it from the plaintiffs. It was endorsed by the payees,
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and discounted by the plaintiffs. The drawer and payees of the
note were all insolvent.
The defendant sibmitted the following points:1. The blank endorsement "Solomon Schafer," on the note in
suit, of itself alone, imports no liability of Solomon Schafer in
favor either of the payees or of their endorsee the plaintiffs.
2. Upon such endorsement, the holder can in no event recover
except upon satisfactory proof of a contract of guaranty or suretyship, by such endorser, and that the note was discounted upon
the faith of such contract.
3. If the proof of such a contract of guaranty or suretyship,
shows it to rest in parol, it isvoid under the statute of frauds and
no recovery can be had upon it.
The court answered the difendant's points in the negative, and
directed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiffs for the whole
amount of their claim.
The defendant took a writ of error, and assigned for error the
admission of the evidence in the several bills of exceptions, and
the charge of the court.
0. H. Meyer and H. Green, for plaintiff- in errdr-J. Shafer,
Jr., was incompetent: Purviancev. .Dryden,8 S.& R. 402; Heckert
v. Pegely, 6 W. & S. 142; Porter v. Wilson, 1 Harris 641;
Geoghegan v. ReecZ, 2 Wh. 152; Hinckley v. Waters, 9 Watts
179 ; Barnes v. Ball, 1 Mass. 73 ; Talbot v. Clark, 8 Pick. 51 ;
Herrick v. Whitney, 16 Johns. 240; S haver v. .hle, Id. 201;
Martinv. Henrickson, 1 Ld. Raym. 1007; fcKennon v. JcRae,
2 Porter 389; Baskins v. Wilson, 6 Cowan 471; Steinmetz v.
Currie, 1 Dallas 269; Bailey v. Knapp, 7 Harris 192; Hatz v.
Sngder, 2 Casey 511; -LoudonSaving Fund v. HagerstownBank,
12 Id. 498; Purdy v. -Dedrich,2 Phila. R. 278. The defendant's name on the note created no liability: Shenk v. Robeson, 2
Grant 372; Schollenberger v. Nehf,4 Casey 189; Fegenbush v.
Zany, Id. 193; Barto v. Schmeck, Id. 447; Smith v. Kessler, 8
Wright 142. The testimony of the witnesses was to charge the
defendant by parol for the debt of another: Act of April 26th
1855, § 1, Pamph. L. 808; Purd. 497, pl. 4. The defendant by
his endorsement did not give authority under the circumstances
in this case to make a contract over his name, or if he did it has
not been exercised, and it is too late at the trial: Tillman v.
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Wheeler, 17 Johns. 326; Jack v.
3J1artinT.

3

i f1orrison,
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12 Wright 113;

-Dffy, 17 Leg. Int. 148; Farebrotherv. Simmons, 5

B. & A. 353.
The first count alleges that the defendant was surety. The
evidence of J. Schafer, Jr., tends to prove a guaranty of the defendant to the payees, not the bank. The other counts charged
the defendant as second endorser, the payees being first endorsers.
The proof does not sustain the allegation in any of the counts: 1
Greenl. Ev. § 66, and cases cited in the notes: Bowan v. Bowan,
5 Casey 181; Begely v. Bellas, 5 Harris 67. This is the case of
an irregular endorsement without any contract of guaranty: Taylo,:v. JfcCune, 1 Jones 465; Tillman v. Wheeler, 17 Johns. 326;
Uinangst v. Hibler, 2 Casey 150 ; petriken v. Baldy, 7 W. & S.
429. There was no agreement with the bank to give time, which
would be necessary to bind the defendant: M2liller v. Stem, 2 Barr
286. There was no consideration for defendant's promise to pay
the note: Paul v. Stackhouse, 2 Wright 302.
7. -. Armstrong and T -D. faxwell, for defendants
in error.-The defendant became liable to a holder by his
endorsement: H~errick v. Carman, 12 Johns. 159; KYner v.
Shower, 1 Harris 444; Edwards on Bills 231, 245, 259, 274;
Hall v. Niewcomb, 3 Hill R. 233; Seabury v. Hungerford, 2 Id.
80; Cottrell v. Conklin, 4 Duer R. 45; Barto v. Schmeck, 4
Casey 447; Lecoon v. Kirkman, 95 E. 0. L. 929 ; Weaver v.
3
farwel, 12 La. 517; Story on Promissory Notes, § 134. J.
Shafer, Jr., was competent: 1 Greenl. Ev. § 899; Steckel v.
Steckel, 4 Casey 233; Taylor v. MktcCune, 1 Jones 461. The
proniise need not be made to the plaintiff himself: Beers v. Bobinson, 9 Barr 229; Leech v. Hill, 4 Watts 448; Campbell v.
Knapp, 3 Harris 30; Schollenberger v. Nehf, 4 Casey 191;
Pegenbush v. Lang, Id. 193; Eerrick v. Carman, 10 Johns.
224; Shenk v. Bobeson, 2 Grant 372; Levy v. Peters,9 S. & R.
125; Sherer v. Easton Bank, 8 Casey 141. The Statute of
Frauds does not interfere, the consideration moved directly from
the promissee to the promissor: -Paul v. Stackhouse, 2 Wright
302. The defendant's endorsement alone is sufficient: Story on
Promissory Notes 640; Oakley v. Johnson, 21 Wend. 588;
Smallwood Y. Vernon, 1 Strange 478; Ballengall v. Gloster, 3
East 482; Bussell v. Langstaffe, Doug. 514; Josselyn v. Ames,
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8 Mass. R. 278; White v. Howland, 9 Id. 815; Hunt v. Adams,
5 Id. 358; Palmer v. Grant, 4 Conn. R. 389; B8eckwith v.
Angel, 6 Id. 815; and see other cases cited in Dean v. Hall, 17
Wend. R. 219, 220; Seymour v. Van Slyek, 8 Wend. R. 421,
422; Chitty on Bills 218, 219; Hill v. Lewi8, 1 Salk. 132.
The opinion of the court was delivered, May 11th 1869, by
SHARSWOOD, J.-In what light one who endorses a promissory
note before the payee is to be regarded has long been a much
vexed question in the American cases. Their name is legion.
More than fifty are cited in a note to Byles on Bills 144, 5th
American edition, without pretending by any means to give a
catalogue of all. In some he is treated as a joint and several
promissor with the maker; again, as a guarantor to the payee,
and all others who may lawfully be possessed of the note, each
holder having a right to fill in such undertaking over his name;
in others as a second endorser, the payee having the right at anytime to restrict his own prior endorsement by the words "without
recourse ;" and in others, still as a second endorser merely under
an implied engagement by the payee to assume the position and
all the responsibilities of first endorser. I a large majority of
them he is treated as an original promissor or a guarantor, according as the evidence may show the original contract of the
parties to have been. It will be sufficient to refer simply to the
cases in this state. In Leech v. Hill, 4 Watts 448, this court
declined to say what would be the effect of such an endorsement,
unaccompanied by evidence deaora, and declared that there was
no other rule by which it is to be construed than according to the
understanding of the parties. In Taylor v. Mco 6une, 1 Jones
460, however, it was decided that in the absence of any such evidence his position was that of second endorser. The opinion of
the court, as delivered by Mr. Justice BELL, adopts Herick v. Car.
man, 12 Johns. 159, as a sound exposition of the law;- for the
reason that otherwise there would be no case where a note is innocently endorsed by a second endorser previously to endorsement
by the payee in which, without his knowledge, his responsibility
might not be varied. It is difficult, indeed, to see how any other
construction can be put on the mere face of the paper. In .Kyner
v. Shower, 1 Harris 446, Chief Justice GIBSON evidently misapprehended the decision in Taylor v. Jc (une, which had not then
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been reported, though he took part in it. He relies on it as
establishing not merely that it might be shown by extrinsic evidence what the agreement was, but that when there is no evidence
it is an authority to the payee to write over the name of the endorser any form of efigagement he may see proper. Taylor v.
JIcCune, on the contrary, expressly repudiated such a doctrine.
In Schollenberger v. lNehf, 4 Casey 189, and 1?egenbush v. Lang,
Id. 193, which were both of them actions by the payee, the same
principle was reasserted. In Barto v. Scitmeck, Id. 447, which
was a suit by a third person as endorsee or holder, the rule was
reconsidered and reaffirmed. It was held that it was equally
available as a defence against a third person as the original party;
that it was a fraud for the payee to negotiate the note without
himself assuming the responsibility of first endorser, and that
whoever took the paper did so with enough upon its face to put
him upon inquiry for the special agreement, if there was one.
This case was again followed in Shenk v. Robeson, 2 Grant 372.
These determinations, however, all admit that when there is
evidence of what was the special agreement or understanding of
the parties, such an irregular endorser may be held liable according to its terms. "He means," says Chief Justice GIBSON, in
.Kyner v. Shower, " to give credit to the paper as an original promissor; but in what character or how far, whether as a surety
absolutely bound for the redemption of it, or as a guarantor contingently bound, depends on circumstances." The cases thus far
referred to were on transactions before January 1st 1856, when
the Act of April 26th 1855, entitled "A Supplement to the Act
for the prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, passed 21st day of
March 1772" (Pamph. L.308), went into effect. That act following the 4th section of the English statute, 29 Car. II., c. 3, provided that no action shall be brought "whereby to charge the
defendant, upon any special promise to answer for the debt or
default of another, unless the agreement upon which such action
shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be
in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or
some other person by him authorized." The question of the liability of a party upon such an anomalous endorsement since the
statute arose in Tack v. Morrison, 12 Wright 113, which was an
action by the payee. He declared upon a contract of guaranty
by the defendant, and that he had endorsed the note in pursuance
VOL. XVI.-44
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of it. It was held to be within the provision of the statute, and
that the defendant's signature was not the requisite note in writing,
for it imported only an endorsement of commercial paper, and
made him liable as endorser only to subsequent and not to prior
holders.
In view of the importance of the question, especially since the
Act of 1855, we ordered it to be reargued as an open one before
a'full bench. Our unanimous conclusion is to adhere to these
decisions. In settling, finally, what shall be the rule in this state
there are, undoubtedly, considerations which weigh on either side.
That the endorser did mean to assume a responsibility, and that
not of a primary but secondary character, is to be deduced from
the very act of writing his name on the back of a negotiable note.
Nothing else can be inferred. He must be presumed to be acquainted with the law merchant, at least so far as to know that
the name of the payee would also be .necessary in order to transfer the title to a purchaser, and that regularly his name would
stand first on the paper. This presumption might be rebutted by
evidence if it was not for the statute. But as the statute imperatively compels the court to shut out any parol testimony of a'
guaranty or engagement to be liable to the payee for the payment
of the note, which is the primary debt of the maker, and thereby
"to answer for the debt or default of-another;" the only conclusion which can be drawn from the circumstanco of endorsement
before the payee, is that the party intended to occupy the position of second endorser. He might well argue: this note cannot
be discounted without the name-of the payee upon it; and if it be
written after my name it will not be an assignment to me, but to
some subsequent holder. No bank or other cautious party will
take it upon my responsibility, without an explicit understanding
with me on the subject. In iferik v. Carman, 12 Johns. 160,
SPENCER, J., said: "The fact of his endorsing first in point of
time can have no influence, for he must have- known, and we are
to presume that he acted on that knowledge, that though the first
to endorse, his endorsement would be nugatory-unless preceded
by that of the payee of the note."
It is said that the signature is an aut6ority to the holder to
write any engagement above it which is consistent with the agreement of the parties. But the question recurs, what was that
agreement, and if oral, is it such as can be supported consistently

SCHAFER v. FARMERS' AND MECHANICS' BANK.

691

with the provision of the statute ? If there was express evidence
of authority to the payee to endorse " without recourse," then,
indeed, the prima facies arising from the signature would be
rebutted. If the second endorser allowed the paper to pass from
his hands in such a condition that these words might be written
with the endorsement of the payee above his name, then as to
bond fide holders for value without notice, he would certainly be
conclusively bound to answer as second endorser, but if sued by
the payee in the.character of a subsequent endorser, he undoubtedly
could show that in fact such restricted endorsement was not made
until after he had signed, and as to any liability to the payee it
may well be questioned whether it would not be a mere evasion
of the statute that was intended to prevent perjuries as we-. as
frauds; and it would fail to accomplish this aim if the mere form
in which the oral engagement is expressed should be allowed to
xiake a distinction when the substance of it is still mevely "a
special promise to answer for the debt or default of another."
To quarrel with the result in any case as unjust and contrary to
the honest contract of the parties, is to quarrel with the policy
and justice of the law. We are bound to execute the statute in
good faith, and warned by the beacons, which stand all along the
coasts of English jurisprudence, to beware of beginning to evade
or make -nice exceptions to the enactments of the legislature,
which have led the English courts9, both on the Statute of Frauds
and Perjuries, and the Statute of Limitations, so far astray.
Obsta principis is the true rule. We have begun in this spirit
in regard to the Act .of 1855. We must be careful not to be
tempted to turn aside from it by the hardship of any particular
case. Hard cases, it is often said, make bad precedents. But
were there more doubt as to the soundness of the principle settled
in Barto v. Schmeck, and Jack v. -Mtorrison, than there is, we
ought not now to depart from them. The commercial community,
especially that part which deals in negotiable paper, will soon
understand how the law is settled on this subject, and will govern
themselves 'accordingly. To overrule these cases and establish
any other rule would lead to worse consequences by creating the
feeling that the point was still unsettled. "1The traditional
experience of the courts," as has been said by Lord ELDON, "does
not furnish a wiser maxim than that which is contained in the
short precept stare decisis :" 1 Bligh 24.

